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1. Introduction 
The superannuation industry has grown 
considerably and become central to the financial 
architecture of the Australian economy and the 
lives of all Australians. A series of significant reports 
including the Super System Review (2010), Financial 
System Inquiry (2014), ASIC (2018), Productivity 
Commission (2018c) have highlighted systemic and 
structural problems in the industry that remain in 
urgent need of attention. The deliberations of Round 
5 of the Financial Services Royal Commission have 
fully demonstrated the scale and immediacy of the 
ongoing systemic misconduct in the Australian 
financial services sector regarding superannuation, 
and the weak governance and regulatory structures 
that have allowed this to happen. Serious omissions 
and exemptions in superannuation regulation are 
impacting badly on the interests of superannuation 
fund members.
The governance failures, omissions and exemptions 
undermine the purpose and performance of 
superannuation and require restoring a more  
robust legislative and regulatory framework. 
This new framework needs to clarify roles and 
responsibilities to ensure the system is meeting its 
objectives efficiently, and that all stakeholders are 
making transparent decisions in the best interests  
of members.
The Terms of Reference of the Financial Services 
Royal Commission propose that “all Australians 
have the right to be treated honestly and fairly 
in their dealings with banking, superannuation 
and financial services providers” and that “these 
standards should continue to be complemented by 
strong regulatory and supervisory frameworks.”
The research papers prepared by AIST (Goodwin 
2018; AIST 2018) on gaps and exemptions in the 
regulation of superannuation, together with the 
evidence considered by the Royal Commission 
in its Round 5 on superannuation in September 
2018, suggest that the regulatory and supervisory 
frameworks for superannuation are in need of 
significant repair to rebuild effective governance, 
ensure the integrity of trustees duties, end systemic 
conflicts of interest, and eliminate gaps and 
exemptions which have led to poor outcomes for 
superannuation fund members. 
A consistent pattern running through 
all of the legislative and regulatory gaps 
and governance failures have allowed 
members to be manipulated.
There is a consistent pattern running through 
all of the legislative and regulatory gaps, 
governance failures and conflicts of interest in 
the superannuation system in the way they have 
allowed members to be manipulated between 
different schemes by Choice providers pursuing 
higher fees for the providers, not members interests’ 
in higher returns.
In the existing legislative and regulatory framework 
of superannuation in Australia, the purpose of 
superannuation is not articulated with sufficient 
clarity and conviction, and the performance 
of superannuation funds is not measured with 
sufficient rigour and comparability. This is fully 
demonstrated in the AIST Gaps and Exemptions 
in the Regulation of Superannuation – Their Scope, 
Rationale and Impact (2018). 
This paper reviews the evidence on the implications 
of the gaps and exemptions documented in  
AIST (Goodwin 2018) and AIST (2018) for the 
governance and performance outcomes of the 
Australian superannuation industry and focuses 
upon the causes of poor member outcomes. The 
remedy of a new regulatory architecture for the 
superannuation sector and refocusing of institutions 
and products upon the long-term interests of 
beneficiaries is compelling.
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  40,000 choices confuse members and hinder the regulators







Funds under management $492 billion $103 billion $535 billion $479 billion
Number of products 69 42 244 628
Number of investment choices 69 42 878 39,207
Number of licensed providers 65 21 76 38
Source: RiceWarner and SuperRatings for AIST
  Choice underperforms and overcharges
Choice
Profit-to-member funds median Retail funds median
Median fee for Capital Stable 
option* on $50,000 account 
balance
$473pa $783.02pa
Average 1 year return for Capital 
Stable investment option
6.23%pa 4.92%pa
Average 10 year return for 
Capital Stable option
4.89%pa 4.00%pa
Median annual fee for Balanced 
option+ on $50,000 account 
balancer
$598pa $846.50pa
Average 1 year return for a 
Balanced investment option
10.45%pa 9.05%pa
Average 10 year return for a 
Balanced investment option
5.45%pa 4.34%pa
Source: SuperRatings for AIST (*20-40% in growth assets) (+60-76% in growth assets)
In the Choice sector, bank 
and retail-owned funds:
Charge between 117-182% more 
than profit-to member funds 
and generally underperform over both 
the short and long term.
The median profit-to-member 
MySuper: 
Has delivered 8.33%* pa to 
members over 3 years 
This is well in excess of the 6.66%* 
per annum by bank and retail-owned super 
funds – and at substantially lower fees. 
How Choice is eroding members’ super
1. Structural confusion and systemic underperformance
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  If you are 25 now and retire at 67 – comparing your super if 
you invest in MySuper or a Choice product*




How Choice is eroding members’ super
2. Lack of disclosure and comparability
Choice products do 
not disclose or report 
to the regulators on 
the same basis as 
MySuper
Choice members  
losing $53 billion  
over the next 10 years*
This puts pressure 
on our Age Pension 
costs which 




Choice to be 
unaccountable
    Choice products 
should disclose 






* Compared with investing in a median MySuper product. Source: RiceWarner for AIST
*  Assumptions – see: http://www.aist.asn.au/media/1212736/cameo_analysis_of_mysuper_vs_choice_final.pdf
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2. Compromised governance 
Australia adopted a trust structure for the 
governance of superannuation funds (AIST 
2017:23). The fiduciary and statutory duties of 
trustees is to manage the assets of the trust 
on behalf of, and in the best interests of, the 
beneficiaries of the trust (Superannuation Industry 
(Supervision) Act 1993 s 52). The Super System 
Review recommended additional duties to ensure 
that the trustee is truly accountable to members, 
and unfettered in its pursuit of the best interests 
of members (Super System Review (2010: 10-14). 
The Gillard Government implemented these 
recommendations as part of the Stronger Super 
reforms (Superannuation Legislation Amendment 
(Trustee Obligations and Prudential Standards) Act 
2012).1. Because of this Act, trustees who offer 
MySuper products have more focused duties to:
 » Promote the financial interests of beneficiaries, 
in particular returns (after the deduction of fees, 
costs and taxes).
 » Determine annually whether the members are 
disadvantaged because of lack of scale, in terms 
of number of members or assets.
 » Include details of the trustee’s determination of 
scale in the investment strategy for the product.
 » Include the investment return target over 10 
years for the assets of the product, and the level 
of risk appropriate to the investment of those 
assets, in the investment strategy, and update 
this information annually.
Yet these duties do not apply to trustees in relation 
to Choice products and investment options, though 
they remain subject to the duties to members under 
trust law. As AIST (2017:24) highlights, this may 
send conflicting signals to Choice trustees regarding 
their duties.
Conflicting signals may be sent to  
Choice trustees.
At the Financial Services Royal Commission (2018) 
in Round 5 considering Superannuation, the Senior 
Counsel Assisting raised the question in his closing 
speech of whether there are retail structures which 
raise inherent problems for trustees being able to 
meet their fiduciary duties (FSRC Module 5 Closing 
Submissions Section 825.17).
A Royal Commission background paper – the Legal 
Framework Governing Aspects of the Australian 
Superannuation System – sets out the demanding 
legal position of fund trustees “Superannuation fund 
trustees operate in a complex legal environment. 
First and foremost, they are trustees and therefore 
are subject to all the ordinary principles of the law 
of trusts, except to the extent these are displaced by 
legislation….  Their duties as trustee include certain 
‘core’ obligations, such as the duty to keep and render 
accounts; the duty not to allow a conflict between 
duty and interest …” (Hanrahan 2018:7). The essential 
fiduciary duty of trustees is to exercise independent 
judgement in the best interests of fund members.
The levels of complexity of fund trustees’ duties vary 
according to the structure adopted by the fund. Of the 
$1,701 billion total of APRA regulated assets (which 
excludes $712 billion of self-managed super fund 
assets), the large institutional funds are classified into 
four types:
  Retail funds operate under the trusteeship of a 
‘for-profit’ RSE licensee with a corporate, industry 
or general membership base.
  Industry funds operate under the trusteeship of a 
‘not-for-profit’ RSE licensee with either an industry 
or general membership base.
  Public sector funds operate under the trusteeship 
of a ‘not-for-profit’ some with an RSE licensee with 
a government membership base.
  Corporate funds generally operate under the 
trusteeship of a ‘not-for-profit’ RSE licensee 
with a corporate membership base (Productivity 
Commission 2016:30).
For not-for-profit industry funds, public sector funds, 
and corporate funds, the position of the trustee 
to act in the best interests of members is clearly 
defined. However, in the case of for-profit retail 
funds the position is not as clear. The for-profit retail 
superannuation funds were established to generate 
profits for the corporations that own them, including 
the large banks. The trustees of the for-profit retail 
funds are potentially torn between their duties as 
trustees to the members, and the corporate interests 
of the parent bank.
For-profit retail superannuation funds were 
established to generate profits for the 
corporations that own them.
Serious failures in superannuation governance and critical omissions in superannuation regulation: Professor Thomas Clarke   5
In Australasian Annuities Pty Ltd (in liq) v Rowley 
Super Fund Pty Ltd, Garde AJA regarding when  
a company is the corporate trustee stated the 
position as: 
“ In circumstances where a company is a corporate 
trustee, a director acting in the best interests of 
the company as a whole must act in good faith 
to ensure that the company administers the trust 
in accordance with the trust deed having regard 
to the rights and interests of the beneficiaries 
of the trust. The best interests of the company 
as a corporate trustee are to act properly in 
accordance with the trust deed in managing 
the business of the trust and in dealing with the 
assets and liabilities of the trust. A director of a 
corporate trustee must act in good faith to ensure 
that the company complies with its obligations 
as a trustee, and properly discharges the duties 
imposed on it by the trust deed and by trust 
law generally. It is not in the best interests of 
the company for it to act in breach of its duties 
of a trustee, for the company has assumed the 
responsibilities of that office and must see to it 
that they are fulfilled.” (Hanrahan 2018:33).
However, this resolution in principle is much 
harder for trustees to maintain in practice. The 
Commonwealth Government’s Stronger Super 
Reform package in 2011 and 2012 included clearer 
duties for directors of superannuation trustee boards 
and other measures to improve the governance 
and integrity of the superannuation system. Though 
these measures were expected by Government to 
‘reduce the average fees paid by members by up to 
40 per cent,’ this saving did not eventuate (Hanrahan 
2018:10).
Despite the many efforts at reform, it remains the 
practice for retail superannuation funds to appoint 
executives from within the corporate group as 
trustees of the fund. This leads to immediate and 
continuous conflicts of interest that trustees must 
resolve. The Royal Commission in Round 5 revealed 
many examples of how the for-profit corporate 
ownership structure caused profound difficulties 
for bank executives to comply with their essential 
fiduciary duties to fund members, for example in 
the widespread and prolonged delay in transferring 
members to MySuper which would have benefited 
the members, but not the bottom line of the bank. 
As employees of the corporation owning the 
fund, executive/trustees are placed in an invidious 
position of subordination to the shareholder primacy 
orientation of their corporate managers. 
In the FSRC Module 5 Closing Submissions the 
following questions are asked:
“Are there structures that raise inherent problems  
for a superannuation trustee being able to comply 
with its fiduciary duties.” (825:17)
“If certain structures do raise inherent problems,  
is structural change of entities, mandated by 
legislation or otherwise, something that is desirable?” 
(Section 825:18)
“Would it be preferable to extend the obligation to act 
in the best interest of members of a superannuation 
fund so that:
 (i)  contravention of the obligation attracts a  
civil penalty; and 
 (ii)  the obligation (and the civil penalty for 
breach) extends to shareholders of trustees 
and any related bodies corporate (within 
the meaning of the Corporations Act) of the 
trustee in respect of any conduct that will 
affect the interests of the members of the 
superannuation fund?”
The weight of the evidence gathered by the Royal 
Commission clearly demonstrates that structural 
problems are inhibiting trustees from complying 
with their fiduciary duties; and that structural 
change of entities is required by legislation to 
eliminate these problems. It would be a further 
reform of profound significance if the obligation to 
act in the best interest of members was extended, 
with contravention attracting civil penalties, and 
included the shareholders of trustees and any 
related bodies corporate of the trustee with respect 
to conduct affecting the interests of the members of 
a superannuation fund.
It would be a reform of profound 
significance if the obligation to act in 
members’ best interest were extended  
to include related bodies.
Evidence was revealed at the Royal Commission 
that the interests of shareholder returns systemically 
predominate in for-profit retails funds rather than 
superannuation fund members’ best interests. 
Simply because a practice is deeply embedded 
in routine financial institutional mechanisms, has 
historically been accepted, and is conducted on a 
mass scale, does not make it legal or permissible. 
These are deeply compromised governance 
structures requiring urgent reform.
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3.  Systemic conflicts of interest 
and related party transactions
The flawed governance of the for-profit retail 
funds generates systemic conflicts of interest. 
The conflicts of interest exposed by the Royal 
Commission in the practices of Australian financial 
institutions for-profit superannuation funds are 
large scale, unconscionable, and deeply damaging 
to the long-term financial health of many of their 
customers. The ownership structure of retail funds 
generates pervasive conflicts of interest in the 
use of related parties. Both APRA and the Royal 
Commission have discovered that where services 
are provided from within the same corporate group, 
superannuation funds pay more for the services. 
Significantly higher fees are paid to related party 
administrators.
The Productivity Commission has stated that 
“Conflicts of interest are managed differently 
depending on whether the trustees operate under a 
not-for-profit or for-profit structure.” It considers that 
governance arrangements for not-for-profit trustees 
are concerned with managing conflicts between 
the trustee and the member, while for-profit trustee 
arrangements must also manage the interests of 
shareholders (Productivity Commission (2016:285; 
Hanrahan 2018:36).
However, many institutional superannuation 
funds are essentially virtual organisations in 
which trustees outsource functions to, and 
acquire products and services from, related-party 
providers including fund administration, investment 
management and asset consulting, custodial 
services, insurance and advice for members. This 
creates major governance dilemmas for “how 
responsibility is allocated between trustees and the 
entities to which they outsource functions related to 
the operation of the fund” (Hanrahan 2018:37).
The level of related party transactions occurring in 
major Australian financial institutions as a normal 
part of doing business is breathtaking. This would 
not be conceivably tolerated in other industries. The 
fact that related party transactions have become 
habitual in finance – an industry ostensibly based 
on fundamental principles of trust and integrity – 
is incredible, and a testimony to light regulation, 
entrenched market power and successive 
governments looking the other way. 
4. Light touch regulation
The neglect of beneficiaries’ interests endemic in 
the Australian for-profit superannuation sector has 
occurred in a context of light touch regulation, that 
has condoned the structures in which compromised 
governance is embedded, permitted trustees to 
neglect beneficiaries interests, and allowed corporate 
conflicts of interest and related party transactions to 
fester. When serious misconduct by superannuation 
trustees is detected by ASIC as in the case of 
CBA and ANZ examined in Round 5 of the Royal 
Commission, the enforceable undertakings agreed 
between ASIC and the CBA and ANZ involved light 
penalties that did not compensate members for 
the losses they incurred when switched from high 
performing and low fee MySuper products to poorly 
performing, high fee superannuation products owned 
by the banks. 
Successive efforts at systemic reform of the 
superannuation system have been undermined 
by the reluctance of the for-profit retail sector to 
countenance change, and the regulators tolerating 
the pursuit of corporate interests by the large 
financial institutions, rather than defending the 
interests of superannuation fund members. Hence 
the centre-piece of the Super System Review (2010) 
reform with MySuper intended as a well-designed 
simplified product for the majority of members, 
with scale, transparency and comparability aimed 
at achieving better member outcomes, was allowed 
by the regulators to be delayed and diverted on a 
large scale by for-profit funds in favour of their own 
products with poorer returns and little transparency. 
MySuper products were able to be offered from  
1 July 2013, and default superannuation guarantee 
payments could only be made into a MySuper 
product. However, trustees had up to 1 July 2017 
to transfer existing default members from a Choice 
product to a MySuper product. AIST continuously 
advocated that retail funds were deferring members 
too slowly. Senior Counsel assisting the FSRC 
questioned whether such delays were in the best 
interests of the members.
Serious failures in superannuation governance and critical omissions in superannuation regulation: Professor Thomas Clarke   7
5.  The purpose and performance  
of superannuation
The essence of good governance is to define 
the purpose and objectives of the organisation 
and to pursue the objectives with efficiency and 
effectiveness. Defying this logic, in the past there 
were no explicit duties of trustees to promote the 
finance interests of beneficiaries, or to apply a scale 
test for Choice products/investment options.
APRA has issued a member outcomes prudential 
standard to enhance and replace the scale test 
that would include Choice products/investment 
outcomes. However, the Treasury Laws Amendment 
(Improving Accountability and Member Outcomes 
in Superannuation Measures No 1) Bill 2017 
presently being considered by the Senate, if passed 
unamended, will legislate a members’ outcome test, 
but exclude Choice products/investment options.
Superannuation members in Australia are faced 
with an industry that is complex, fragmented, 
opaque and often impenetrable. APRA recognises 
86 MySuper products but over 40,000 member 
investment choices. Yet the choices made by 
members are fateful. In 2018, SuperRatings found 
substantial differences between fees for MySuper 
and Choice products, particularly within retail 
superannuation funds even when the underlying 
asset allocations were almost identical.
The SuperRatings (2018) research shows that the 
median profit-to-member MySuper has delivered 
8.33% per annum to members over 3 years, 
significantly in excess of the 6.66% per annum 
delivered by bank and retail-owned super funds, 
and with substantially lower fees. The extensive 
evidence from SuperRatings (2018) indicates the 
Choice sector bank and retail-owned funds charge 
between 117-182% more than profit-to-member 
funds and generally underperform them over the 
both the short and long term.
Recent research by Rice Warner (2018) 
consultants reveals some startling figures 
relating to the comparative performance 
of the MySuper superannuation 
products and Choice products. Utilising 
past performance data, the forecast 
for individual outcomes suggest that 
individual members who remain in 
Choice products could be as much as 
$50,000 worse off compared with those 
who invest in a MySuper fund for a high 
income ($100,000 pa) earner, a difference 
of ten per cent. Collectively, Choice 
members could be as much as $52.5 
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Such comparisons indicate that the inevitable 
consequences for superannuation fund members of 
the degree of systemic complexity, opaqueness and 
poor performance in the Choice superannuation 
sector are:
 » The compounding impact of higher fess over 
the long term significantly reduces retirement 
incomes for members of Choice products.
 » Choice overload leaves members baffled 
about the selection and performance of their 
superannuation.
 » The Choice sector of the superannuation industry 
survives without achieving efficiencies of scale 
or delivering comparable benefits to members 
(Goodwin 2017; AIST 2018b).
There is mounting evidence of the systemic neglect 
of members interests in the pursuit of higher fees by 
Choice providers:
 » AIST in submissions to the Financial Services 
Royal Commission (FSRC) and to the Productivity 
Commission (AIST 2018a) highlights the lack of 
comprehensive Choice disclosure or reporting 
means that it is difficult to gauge member 
outcomes for Choice products, even with a new 
member outcomes test. How such higher fees 
could possibly be in members’ best interests is 
queried by AIST.
 » ASIC (2018) REP 562 Financial advice: Vertically 
Integrated Institutions and Conflicts of Interest, 
conducted a survey of the quality of personal 
advice of the largest banking and financial 
services institutions in Australia provided by their 
largest advice licensees authorised to provide 
personal advice to retail clients (AMP, ANZ, CBA, 
NAB and Westpac), and assessed the quality of 
personal advice being provided to customers. 
ASIC discovered 75 per cent of files reviewed 
were non-compliant, with 10 per cent of such  
non-compliant advice raising significant 
concerns about the financial position of these 
customers. ASIC concluded:
 “ In 10% of the sample advice files, we had 
significant concerns about the impact of 
the non-compliant advice on the customer’s 
financial situation. We were significantly 
concerned because, for these customers, 
switching to the new superannuation platform 
resulted in inferior insurance arrangements and/
or a significant increase in ongoing product fees 
– without additional benefits being identified 
that were consistent with the customer’s 
relevant circumstances.”
(ASIC offers the following definition: “A customer’s 
relevant circumstances are the objectives, financial 
situation and needs of a customer that would 
reasonably be considered relevant to the subject  
matter of advice sought by the customer.”)
‘…the high level of noncompliant advice, combined 
with the high proportion of funds invested in  
in-house products,suggests that the advice  
licensees we reviewed may not be appropriately 
managing the conflict of interest associated with  
a vertically integrated business model.’
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 » The Productivity Commission in its draft 
Competition in the Australian Financial System 
(2018b) report comments on the lack of data 
which makes it impossible for portfolios to be 
benchmarked. The Commission states that funds 
should be required to report to APRA how many 
members switch from MySuper to higher fee 
Choice products.
“The size of, and variation in, net returns 
is critical to members’ retirement 
incomes. But assessing the system’s 
investment performance is challenging. 
The Commission’s focus is on long-term 
performance, compared to benchmark 
portfolios that control for asset allocation. 
While the assessment is not an exact 
science, given data limitations, the 
Commission has erred on the side of 
giving funds the ‘benefit of the doubt’ in 
constructing the benchmarks.”
 » The Productivity Commission in its final report 
on Competition in the Australian Financial System 
(2018c) presents a series of damning conclusions 
regarding the levels of competition, conflicts 
of interest, disclosure, advice, information, and 
regulation in the financial services industry:
“ The larger financial institutions, particularly 
but not only in banking, have the ability to 
exercise market power over their competitors 
and consumers. – Many of the highly profitable 
financial institutions have achieved that state 
with persistently opaque pricing; conflicted 
advice and remuneration arrangements; layers 
of public policy and regulatory requirements  
that support larger incumbents; and a lack  
of easily accessible information, inducing 
unaware customers to maintain loyalty to 
unsuitable products.” 
“ Poor advice and complex information supports 
persistent attachment to high margin products 
that boost institutional profits, with product 
features that may well be of no benefit. – What 
often is passed off as competition is more 
accurately described as persistent marketing 
and brand activity designed to promote a 
blizzard of barely differentiated products and 
‘white labels’.”
“ For this situation to persist as it has over 
a decade, channels for the provision of 
information and advice (including regulator 
information flow, adviser effort and broker 
activity) must be failing.”
6. Lack of comparability
The basis of consumer choice is adequate 
information regarding the performance of different 
products. However, there is considerable evidence 
the information required to provide effective 
comparison between different products, and 
informed choice, is being systemically denied to the 
majority of superannuation fund members despite 
any recent reforms. 
The Super System Review (2010) insisted 
“transparency is critical to the efficiency and 
operation of a market-based saving system. 
It improves understanding, awareness and 
engagement at various levels; not always directly 
at member level.” Yet the Review concluded, 
“The superannuation system lacks transparency, 
comparability and accountability in relation to costs, 
fees and investment returns.” 
The Super System Review suggested this lack of 
transparency was due to several factors including:
 » The lack of incentives for trustees to be 
transparent about fees, costs, and investment 
returns.
 » The outsourcing of many functions leading to 
inherent complexity and fees and charges being 
incurred at multiple layers.
 » Cultural barriers to effective disclosure resting 
on the belief that it is only net investment returns 
that matter, without clarity on risk exposure.
 » Product Disclosure Statements (PDSs) 
mechanically reflecting existing complexities, 
inviting a ‘data dump’ approach to fee disclosure 
of many pages.
 » A lack of effective enforcement against those 
who fail to comply with disclosure obligations.
 » And, finally, the language of the debate on data 
and disclosure is largely captured by those 
whom it has suited to characterise members as 
‘investors’ with the purpose of disclosure simply 
to enable choice of fund or investment option.
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 » The Super System Review proposed a new 
set of ‘outcomes reporting standards’ be 
developed by APRA in consultation with ASIC, 
the industry, and stakeholders to improve 
transparency and reporting. This was intended 
to address the measurement, disclosure and 
comparability issues of the superannuation 
industry. The Review proposed a new mandate 
for APRA to monitor and regulate the efficiency 
and outcomes of super funds. The Review 
recommended a new ‘product dashboard’ as 
a guide to super fund performance, and to 
supplement PDS and online disclosures.
The Government has deferred the requirement for 
choice dashboards in 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017. 
The Government plans to amend the laws so funds 
will only need to produce dashboards for their 10 
largest choice options. Having a superannuation 
fund without a dashboard is like driving a car 
without a dashboard: there is no immediate 
information to guide your progress. This ignores 
the advice of successive reviews of the Australian 
financial system.
 » The Super System Review, Financial System 
Inquiry and the Productivity Commission all 
concluded that the level of fees paid by members 
is too high. 
 » SuperRatings (2018) has criticised the poor level 
of disclosure of fees, noting there is a long way to 
achieving comparability of fees across MySuper 
and Choice products/investment options.
 » The Productivity Commission (2018b) draft report 
suggests that “funds which charge higher fees 
do not deliver better returns” and that “there 
are inconsistencies in how fees and costs are 
reported, despite regulator endeavour…  This 
requires immediate redress by the regulators.”
There is a systemic lack of comparability 
of data in the superannuation system 
owing to legislative gaps and exemptions.
Failure to implement a dashboard regime is 
inconsistent with the OECD (2011) Principles that 
providers should give customers standardised 
disclosure to allow comparison between products, 
and that customers should be able to compare and 
switch easily between products and at reasonable 
cost (AIST 2017:36). Further examples of a systemic 
lack of comparability of data in the superannuation 
system include the following:
 » According to Rice Warner consultants, 
approximately 30 per cent of personal 
superannuation assets are held in legacy 
products. But there is no requirement to produce 
a shorter PDS for legacy products. The result is 
that it is more difficult for members in legacy 
products to compare the performance, fees 
or costs of the product with a contemporary 
product, or to understand the exit costs and 
assess whether they would be better off 
switching to a contemporary product.
 » In the same vein, the as yet unimplemented 
dashboard regime for choice products and 
investment options will not apply to legacy 
products. Rice Warner found that fees and 
costs for legacy products are on average more 
than double those for contemporary products. 
(The UK Independent Project Board found that 
$26 billion in legacy pension schemes had 
investment manager fees above 1%, with nearly 
$1 billion exposed to fees over 300 basis points 
per annum). Without a dashboard, members 
who hold legacy superannuation products will 
find it difficult to compare their returns, fees, or 
costs with contemporary products.
 » Portfolio Holdings Disclosure (as with 
dashboards) was deferred by the Government 
four times – in 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017. This 
prevents members seeing the individual holdings 
for their super investments.
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7. Lack of data
As the Super System Review (2010) insisted, access 
to relevant data in the superannuation industry is 
vital to improving the understanding of members, 
to promote competition and drive innovation in the 
industry, and to allow trustees and others to engage 
in benchmarking of fund performance with other 
funds, locally and nationally. 
APRA requires comprehensive data to allow 
effective prudential supervision of superannuation 
funds to ensure funds are operated soundly by 
trustees in accordance with risk management, 
investment strategies and other fund policies. 
Financial advisers need to make informed, evidence-
based recommendations to their clients. Analysis 
of comprehensive data enables APRA to intervene 
early to mitigate losses due to mismanagement. 
Finally, Government and policy advisers require 
reliable industry-wide data to assess the soundness 
of policy settings, and to ensure there is value 
for money for the tens of billions of dollars a year 
investment the government makes in the industry 
through tax concessions. 
Comprehensive and accurate data on 
the performance of the superannuation 
industry is systemically denied through 
successive government sanctioned 
omissions.
This critical need for comprehensive and accurate 
data on the performance of the superannuation 
industry is being systemically denied in government 
sanctioned omissions across large parts of the 
sector. APRA does not collect or publish statistics on 
Choice products or investment options equivalent to 
the comprehensive statistical collection derived from 
the MySuper reporting standards.
 » APRA deferred collecting data for choice 
products/investment options for consideration 
during the development of the requirements for 
Choice dashboards.
 » AIST has advocated that sufficient data should 
be collected to enable APRA at system and fund 
level, and ASIC at product level, to benchmark 
whether good value is being delivered to the 
members. The lack of this data means the 
regulators cannot readily analyse whether, 
for example, related party transactions have 
impacted on system/fund/product performance.
 » At the Financial Services Royal Commission,  
the Senior Counsel Assisting in his round 
5 closing submission queried what would 
encourage regulators to act promptly on 
misconduct. AIST believe one solution is the 
proper collection and analysis of data would help 
identify misconduct, aided by a level playing field 
regarding disclosure. 
 » In an ASIC commissioned review of Regulatory 
Guide 97 on fee and cost structure disclosure, 
McShane (2018) stated that system analysis 
is an important objective of disclosure. AIST 
regards this as a critical objective.
 » Senior Counsel Assisting at the Royal 
Commission in his round 5 closing submission 
raised whether APRA or a new body should 
apply an outcomes filter to MySuper, which 
poses the question how are Choice products 
being assessed?
 » According to Rainmaker, over 70 per cent of 
retail superannuation assets in Australia are 
held via platforms. APRA does not collect or 
publish statistics on platforms, or on legacy 
products, equivalent to the comprehensive 
statistics collection available from MySuper 
reporting. APRA deferred collecting data for 
Choice products/investment options during the 
development of the requirements for Choice 
dashboards. Lack of data hampers the analysis 
of the relative performance of superannuation 
held via a platform by APRA, employers, 
advisers, Government and trustees that 
members rely on.
8. Lack of best interests test
 » There is no requirement to ensure that  
switching super funds is in the best interests  
of the member when giving general advice or 
under no-advice business models. ASIC has 
accepted enforceable undertakings from the 
CBA and ANZ regarding distribution of super 
products through their branches. Industry 
Super Australia has found an increase in cross-
selling retail superannuation using general 
advice and no-advice business models. Through 
this process, members are switched from 
MySuper products to an inferior Choice Product/
Investment option, when it is not in the best 
interests of the member. 
12   Serious failures in superannuation governance and critical omissions in superannuation regulation: Professor Thomas Clarke
9. Lack of disclosure on costs
 » Regulatory Guide 97 new fees and costs 
disclosure requirements do not apply to 
superannuation held via a platform. McShane’s 
(2018) Review recommends changes to ensure 
members understand the aggregation of 
platform costs (product costs and distribution 
costs). AIST has recommended that a review 
of platforms be undertaken in Australia, as in 
the UK, to determine whether platforms are 
delivering value. According to the UK Financial 
Conduct Authority, platforms add 20-90 basis 
points to costs. While the compounding effect 
of higher costs over the long term reduces 
retirement incomes for members, ASIC states it 
would be misleading to compare the fees and 
costs of platforms and non-platform super funds.
10. Conflicted remuneration
 » Conflicted remuneration is banned from most 
of the financial services industry, but there 
is an exemption for advice about retail life 
insurance. In 2017, ASIC set commission caps 
and clawback amounts. In 2014, ASIC found 
more than one third of advice about retail life 
insurance reviewed did not comply with the law, 
and 96% of non-compliance advice was given by 
advisers paid with upfront commissions.
 » Due to exemptions from regulation, conflicted 
remuneration features in other aspects of 
the superannuation system which ASIC has 
condoned – including product issuers using 
consent forms to obtain client consent; rebutting 
the presumption that volume based payment 
is conflicted remuneration; asset based fees 
which are ongoing as a percentage of fees 
under advice; and balanced scorecards which 
incentivise staff to switch customers into bank 
owned superannuation funds (AIST 2017:33).
 » Grandfathered commissions are permitted under 
FoFA. AIST has advocated these commissions 
should be banned. ASIC submitted to the 
FSRC that grandfathered commission should 
be banned as they may encourage advisers 
to keep clients in legacy products rather than 
moving them to better performing products. 
Senior Counsel Assisting FSRC in his closing 
submission in Round Five asked whether 
grandfathered commissions and/or fees should 
be banned. With grandfathered commissions, 
consumers are at significant risk of being 
recommended to stay in a product which is not 
in their best interests. 
11. Product design and distribution
 » If the Improving Accountability and Member 
Outcomes in Superannuation (2017) Bill 
is passed, product manufacturers will be 
exempted. AIST has submitted that the complete 
chain of product manufacturers and distributors 
should be included to ensure ownership of 
accountability. The focus on individual products 
is meaningless given the systemic carveouts 
from the legislative framework and the lack of 
data to assess system/fund value. The proposal 
would require entities issuing PDSs to undertake 
a target market assessment and would provide 
ASIC with product intervention powers to 
remove unsuitable products, including Choice 
products but not legacy products.
12. Exit fees
 » The Government’s proposals in the Protecting 
Your Super package would cap fees for low 
account balances and ban exit fees. However, 
the proposals do not include sell spreads in 
the calculation of exit fees, (buy/sell spreads 
being generally applied in the retail fund sector) 
enabling gaming to increase fees.
13. Conclusions
 » As the AIST (2017:56) concludes, there 
are evident weaknesses in regulation and 
governance in the superannuation sector 
exposed in the many current and proposed 
exemptions, gaps and inconsistencies that apply 
to Choice products and investment options, 
platforms, legacy products, new products 
and self-managed super funds. This panoply 
of self-interested exemption exhibited by the 
for-profit superannuation sector has arisen over 
time, incrementally and without any ostensible 
rationale other than to benefit the providers. 
Self-interested legislative and regulatory 
exemptions exhibited by the for-profit 
superannuation have arisen over time.
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This does not reconcile with the OECD G20 High 
Level Principles on Financial Consumer Protection, 
particularly the principles relating to equitable 
and fair treatment of consumers, disclosure and 
transparency, responsible business conduct, 
competition and the role of oversight bodies; the 
legislated objectives of APRA, ASIC or Chapter 7 of 
the Corporations Act 2001. 
Nor does it reconcile “with the proposed legislative 
objective of superannuation which does not 
distinguish between members depending on what 
kind of fund, product or investment option their 
superannuation is invested in” (AIST 2017:56). In 
summary, these exemptions reduce the protection 
for superannuation fund members, reduce 
competition, and compromise the capacity of 
regulators to supervise the system.
The Australian superannuation system 
requires the development of a new regulatory 
architecture and new institutional structure 
capable of focusing on the best interests of 
super members. 
For this to be achieved, a new business model is 
required that eliminates conflicts of interest between 
members and shareholders. Comprehensive data 
must be accessible on all products and investments 
including data on long term returns. The system 
purpose and objectives of superannuation should be 
firmly anchored in pursuing the optimal long term 
returns for the retirement of beneficiaries.
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